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Abstract 
 
With the passing of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2001, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland became the first country to pass legislation in support of 
embryonic stem cell research and research on embryos created by somatic cell 
nuclear transfer. While the UK legal stance and framework on embryo 
research are well-known and have attracted significant attention from those 
with an interest in the ethics of embryo research both in the UK and elsewhere, 
the arguments on the status of the embryo that were expressed by the members 
 2
of Parliament and the main advisory bodies involved in this legal debate are 
less well-known. This article examines the entire range of arguments 
expressed in support of the Regulations. When the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001 were passed, the UK had 
already established a legal framework on embryo research. Since this new 
legal stance must be understood against the background of these earlier 
developments and discussions on the status of the embryo, this article will also 
sketch the legal history of embryo research in the UK, documenting in 
particular how this legal history has been influenced by the Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology’s arguments on the status of 
the embryo. While I argue that the validity of all the arguments can be 
questioned, I argue also that, as long as people have irreconcilable values, no 
case either for or against granting full moral status to the early embryo can be 
made that will convince everyone. At the same time, by clarifying my own 
position on the status of the early embryo, I hope to throw some light on why I 
believe embryonic stem cell research should not be carried out. Therefore, this 
article will be of interest to all who have an interest in the ethics of embryonic 
stem cell research.   
 
Introduction 
 
  The aim of this article is to provide a critical analysis of the arguments that 
have been produced on the status of the early human embryo by members of 
the UK Parliament and its main advisory bodies in the historical development 
of legislation on embryo research in the UK.1 The primary focus of my article 
is to identify and examine the entire range of arguments expressed in support 
                                                          
1
  The term ‘embryo’ will be used to refer to the ‘human embryo’; and the term 
‘early embryo’ to refer to an embryo not older than 14 days. 
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of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 
2001, when the debate was centred mainly on the issue if early embryos should 
be used for embryonic stem cell research and cloning by somatic cell nuclear 
transfer. While my analysis is restricted to the arguments used in the UK 
debate, there is no doubt that the arguments discussed here have influenced 
legal debate elsewhere. As the UK legal framework, because of its relatively 
early development, has been and is affecting policy debates about embryo 
research elsewhere, the arguments which underlie this framework are in urgent 
need of ethical analysis. More generally, this article will be relevant to 
everyone who has an interest in exploring the ethics of embryonic stem cell 
research. 
 
Embryo research before 1990 
 
  For many years, embryo research took place without being regulated. The 
first major breakthrough in embryo research which gathered unprecedented 
media attention took place in 1978, when - after many years of research into in 
vitro fertilisation (IVF) - Louise Brown, the first human baby conceived 
outside the womb, was born in Oldham Hospital, England. While this event 
stimulated embryo research in the UK and elsewhere, many UK citizens 
expressed opposition and demanded legal debate and a clear legal stance. 
  In 1982 the Department of Health and Social Security of the UK Government 
decided to set up a Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology, chaired by the philosopher Mary Warnock. The Committee came 
to be known as the ‘Warnock Committee’. Apart from a moral philosopher, 
the Committee included one theologian, two social workers, three legal 
professionals, and nine people working in a range of medical disciplines. The 
Committee’s remit was to ‘examine the social, ethical, and legal implications 
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of recent, and potential developments in the field of human assisted 
reproduction’, and published the ‘Warnock Report’ in 1984.[1]  
  Before making its recommendations about research on embryos, the 
Committee examined the legal status of embryos in the UK, referring mainly 
to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the Abortion Act 1967. 
These pieces of legislation make abortion a criminal offence unless any of the 
grounds specified in the latter Act apply. The Committee therefore concluded 
that, while ‘the human embryo per se has no legal status’, these statutory 
provisions do offer some protection.[2] Accordingly, the Committee took the 
view that, while the embryo should not be granted ‘the same status as a living 
child or an adult’ (henceforth: ‘moral status’), the embryo should be given a 
‘special status’ and be ‘afforded some protection in law’.[3] The need for 
‘protection’, however, was not considered to be incompatible with the use of 
the embryo for research, and therefore with embryo destruction. The 
Committee thought embryo research can be justifiable, subject to a number of 
conditions. One condition is what could be called a ‘last resort’ principle. This 
is the view that embryo research would be justifiable only when the research 
could not be done with ‘other animals or in some other way’ and when they 
are not ‘frivolously or unnecessarily used’.[4] Other conditions are that 
informed consent is obtained from the gamete donors ‘whenever this is 
possible’ and that research is licensed and monitored, which is why the 
Committee recommended the creation of a new statutory agency to license all 
embryo research.[5]  
  The Warnock Report does not provide a clear explanation why the embryo 
should not be granted moral status. In the introduction to her publication of the 
Report, Warnock states that the majority of the Committee supported what has 
become known as the ‘gradualist’ view, or the view that the embryo’s status 
increases as he or she develops.[6] ‘One argument’ amongst a ‘wide range of 
opinion’ is referred to as ‘the strictly utilitarian view’ or the view that the 
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question of whether or not to use embryos for research must be settled by ‘the 
balance of benefit over harm, or pleasure over pain’.[7] In this view, ‘as long 
as the embryo is incapable of feeling pain’, his or her ‘treatment does not 
weigh in the balance’.[8] Warnock has identified this view as a contributing 
factor to the majority of her Committee’s support for embryo research.[9]  
  This view is subject to two criticisms. A first problem is how we can know if 
early embryos are incapable of feeling pain. The Committee refers to the 
presence of the ‘beginnings of the central nervous system’.[10] While we 
rightly conclude that those who possess a central nervous system normally 
possess also the capacity to feel pain, this does not rule out the possibility that 
the capacity to feel pain may be present also where there is no central nervous 
system. We should be careful not to construe absence of evidence of sentience 
(the capacity to feel pain) as evidence of absence of sentience. Second, and 
more importantly, even if we assume that early embryos are incapable of 
feeling pain, it is not clear why this should matter morally.2 Anaesthetised 
children, for example, may not be able to feel pain, but many, if not most 
people would agree that this does not justify their destruction for research. I 
suspect that the reason why we believe it is not right to kill children for 
research, therefore, does not relate to the question if they feel pain, but to the 
question if it violates their interests in life. By analogy, many people think that 
it is prima facie wrong to cut down trees not because trees might suffer, but 
because trees have an interest in life. Since it can be argued that early embryos 
also have an interest in life as – like trees – they sustain themselves and have 
an orientation towards growth, the prima facie wrongness of destroying 
embryos does not consist in the fact that the act of destruction might cause 
them pain (as it may not), but in the fact that it destroys their lives. This does 
                                                          
2
 See also Deckers J. (in press) Why Eberl Is Wrong. Reflections on the 
Beginning of Personhood, Bioethics. 
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not imply that sentience is morally irrelevant. In the unlikely scenario where 
we are given the choice, ceteris paribus, between killing a human being with 
the capacity to feel pain and killing a human being without this capacity, we 
should opt to kill the latter. However, this need not imply that the latter has 
less value than the former. This point can be clarified as follows. Imagine 
(only for the sake of my argument) being given the choice between scenario A 
where you are being asked to kill someone while he or she is anaesthetised, 
and scenario B where you are being asked to kill that same person without that 
person being sedated first. While scenario A must be preferred, it is obvious 
that the reason why this scenario must be preferred does not relate to a 
difference in value between the person considered for destruction in scenario 
A and the person considered for destruction in scenario B, given that the same 
person is being considered as the object of killing in both scenarios. Therefore, 
while the killing of those who cannot feel pain must be preferred, ceteris 
paribus, to the killing of those who can feel pain, this need not imply that 
those who lack the ability to feel pain are any less valuable. I conclude, 
therefore, that this ‘argument from sentience’ is unconvincing.   
  Having considered the argument from sentience, the Committee then moves 
on to recommend that the embryo should not be ‘kept alive’ or ‘used as a 
research subject beyond fourteen days after fertilisation’, excluding ‘any time 
during which the embryo may have been frozen’.[11] The relevant paragraph, 
however, does not contain a reference to the argument from sentience. Instead, 
the early embryo is described as ‘a potential human being’.[12] Attention is 
now drawn to ‘the formation of the primitive streak’, which in an earlier 
paragraph is identified as ‘the latest stage at which identical twins can 
occur’.[13] The Committee now expresses the view that this is the moment 
which ‘marks the beginning of individual development of the embryo’.[14] No 
other arguments are provided by the Warnock Committee in support of its 
gradualist position. 
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  What is problematic about this account is that the view that the early embryo 
is not a human being, but merely a potential human being, is implausible. 
Presumably, the Committee arrives at this view on the basis of the view that, 
as long as the early embryo still has the potentiality to become more than one 
individual, it cannot be a human individual already. This ‘argument from 
individuality’ has had long-lasting appeal in the debate on embryo research in 
the UK. One of its chief advocates has been the influential Walton of 
Detchant, a member of the House of Lords, former Dean of Medicine at the 
University of Newcastle, and past President of the British Medical 
Association, the Royal Society of Medicine and the General Medical Council. 
A few years after the publication of the Warnock Report, when embryo 
research was being discussed in UK Parliament, Walton wrote an article 
against the views of the Roman-Catholic Cardinal Basil Hume explaining, as a 
member of the ‘Methodist Church’, the benefits of embryo research for IVF 
and the development of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for the ‘prevention’ 
of inherited disease, and claiming that its rejection would be a ‘devastating 
blow … to that fundamental Christian ethic of aiding those less fortunate than 
ourselves’.[15] Walton asserted that Hume had ‘fallen into the trap of 
perpetuating several errors of argument and logic which are being regularly 
advanced by opponents of research’, but failed to provide an example to 
demonstrate why this should be the case.[16] Another Roman-Catholic, 
however, the Australian Salesian priest Norman Ford, who had just published 
a book with the title ‘When Did I Begin?’, was hailed by Walton as ‘that 
eminent (…) scholar’.[17,18] Walton cited Ford and others as ‘strongly’ 
supportive of ‘the view that individuation of the human embryo (that is, the 
earliest evidence of the existence of a human individual) cannot be thought to 
arise until the appearance of the primitive streak’, a view which he expressed 
also in the House of Lords at that time, and again more than a decade later 
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when the House debated the draft Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations.[19,20]  
  The problem with this argument is that the assumption that, as long as 
something can still become more than one, it cannot be one already, is 
logically flawed. A flatworm, for example, can divide and reconstitute itself 
into more than one individual. Yet we do not conclude from the fact that a 
flatworm can still become more than one individual that it is not an individual 
already, or that it is only a potential flatworm. This was clear already to 
Aristotle, who wrote that for plants and insects that can multiply by division, 
before division, there is ‘actually one’, but ‘potentially many’ souls.[21] 
Therefore, it is not clear why we should conclude that embryos cannot be 
individuals as long as they can still divide into more than one individual. Since 
embryologists describe the early embryo as an individual in his or her own 
right, rather than as part of the female body, describing an early embryo as a 
potential human being is inappropriate. Without making the assumption that 
early embryos are human beings, rather than body parts, it seems difficult to 
explain why they manage to develop in a petri dish, an environment so 
different from the environment provided by the female body. A plausible view 
is that they sustain and develop themselves, as human beings in their own 
right, rather than that external principles direct their development. They are 
living beings, rather than parts of living beings. Therefore, the Warnock 
Committee’s contention that they merely have a ‘potential for life’ is 
flawed.[22] 
  The Warnock Report’s text (as well as Walton’s text) could, however, be 
interpreted in a different way. Even if it were granted that early embryos might 
be individuals already, it may be the case that what is expressed is the view 
that what matters morally is whether or not one is an indivisible or irreversible 
human individual. On this interpretation, early embryos would lack moral 
status because they might still become more than one human individual. A 
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first problem with the validity of this ‘argument from twinning’ is that some 
early embryos might not have the potential to divide and become twins, unless 
they are forced to divide artificially. Therefore, a distinction in moral value 
should be made between those early embryos with the potential to divide on 
their own account and those who lack such potential. In other words, it would 
not provide support for the view that all early embryos lack moral status. A 
second, more significant problem is that no argument is provided for why 
being an indivisible human individual, rather than simply being a human 
individual, should be what matters morally. 
  While the Warnock Report’s support for embryo research met with strong 
opposition in UK Parliament, six years went by before the UK Government 
finally decided on the issue. During this time, support for the 
recommendations of the Warnock Report increased. The sociologist Michael 
Mulkay has reported that this may be related partly to the decision, made by 
the Medical Research Council and the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists, to create a Voluntary Licensing Authority (VLA) in 1985, 
later renamed the Interim Licensing Authority, to regulate embryo research in 
the absence of statutory provisions. Since the existence of this Authority was 
mentioned occasionally in Parliament, some members of Parliament might 
have become convinced that, provided a regulatory authority existed, embryo 
research was not much of a concern. Mulkay also mentions the influence of 
‘Progress’, a pro-research organisation formed shortly after the creation of the 
VLA to block the passage of the Unborn Children (Protection) Bill (the 
‘Powell Bill’) which aimed to prohibit embryo research and to make it a 
criminal offence to fertilise an egg outside the womb unless permission had 
been given by the Health Secretary and the embryo was destined for 
implantation.[23] While it would be interesting to examine the arguments on 
the status of the early embryo expressed by members of UK Parliament in the 
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first major Parliamentary debate on embryo research, such an examination is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The introduction of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
 
  Eventually, supporters of the the Unborn Children (Protection) Bill were 
defeated, and six years after the publication of the Warnock Report, the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 was passed.[24] In accordance 
with the recommendations of the Warnock Report, the Act stipulated that the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) be established, 
materialising in 1991, to license and monitor the use of embryos in UK 
fertilitity clinics and research institutions, and to monitor and review abortion 
services.[25] Its members are appointed by the Secretary of State for Health, to 
whom it is accountable. The Act also enshrined the Warnock Report’s focus 
on the primitive streak as the cut-off point: ‘a licence cannot authorise … 
keeping or using an embryo after the appearance of the primitive streak’, 
where ‘the primitive streak is to be taken to have appeared … not later than the 
end of the period of 14 days beginning with the day when the gametes are 
mixed, not counting any time during which the embryo is stored’.[26] By 
using the words ‘not … keeping or using’, the Act avoids referring to the 
positive acts of destroying or killing which would be required should embryos 
ever be able to develop beyond that stage outside the womb. The fact that 
destruction is intended may also be downplayed where the Act states that after 
the normal statutory storage period of five years cryopreserved embryos ‘shall 
be allowed to perish’.[27]3 
                                                          
3
 Incidentally, Walton used similar language whilst discussing PGD, asserting 
that those embryos ‘carrying abnormal genes will simply be allowed to 
degenerate naturally’. See Walton of Detchant. (1990) Embryo Research – 
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  The Warnock Report’s concern that early embryos should not be used for 
trivial research purposes is accommodated by the paragraph that no licence 
should be granted ‘unless the Authority is satisfied that any proposed use of 
embryos is necessary for the purposes of the research’.[28] The question must 
be asked if this is consistent with the Act’s apparent lack of consideration for 
embryo destruction resulting from the widespread availability and use of what 
is erroneously called the combined ‘contraceptive’ pill and other 
‘contraceptive’ techniques with the potential to block implantation. While the 
Act amends the 1967 Abortion Act, the use of such ‘contraceptive’ techniques 
is exempted from the requirement to satisfy any of the legitimate grounds for 
pregnancy termination.[29] This is so because the Act stipulates that a woman 
is not deemed to be ‘carrying a child’, or to be pregnant, until the embryo has 
implanted so that a termination of pregnancy cannot occur before 
implantation.[30] Since embryologists might define conception as the moment 
when pregnancy starts, this crafty piece of legal tinkering is questionable. This 
apparent lack of consideration for pre-implantation embryos conceived inside 
women’s bodies appears to sit uncomfortably with the Act’s interest in 
ensuring that any proposed research project on embryos who would normally 
be conceived outside women’s bodies pursues goals deemed sufficiently 
worthy in relation to reproduction and congenital disease (or - in the words of 
the Act - is ‘necessary or desirable for the purpose of (a) promoting advances 
in the treatment of infertility, (b) increasing knowledge about the causes of 
congenital disease, (c) increasing knowledge about the causes of 
miscarriages, (d) developing more effective techniques of contraception, 
or (e) developing methods for detecting the presence of gene or chromosome 
                                                                                                                                                        
Why the Cardinal is Wrong, Journal of Medical Ethics, 16, 185-186, p. 186. 
See also Nuffield Council on Bioethics. (2000) Stem Cell Therapy. The 
Ethical Issues. London. Nuffield Council on Bioethics: par. 21. 
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abnormalities in embryos before implantation, or for such other purposes as 
may be specified in regulations).’[31] The apparent inconsistency need not 
necessarily be understood in terms of a contradiction, though. The Act might 
have equal regard for all early embryos, irrespective of whether or not they are 
used for research, but simply regard any destruction of pre-implantation 
embryos by ‘contraceptive’ pills to be sufficiently worthwhile, thereby 
obviating the need to make a distinction between more and less worthy causes 
in relation to ‘contraceptive’ technologies.4 
 
The debate about embryonic stem cell research and cell nuclear 
replacement 
 
  In the late 1990’s, however, it became possible to extract embryonic stem 
cells from early embryos, and many scientists became convinced that these 
might be used to cure a wide range of disease. Also, research carried out at the 
Roslin Institute in Edinburgh, which led to the creation of Dolly the sheep, 
raised the hope that even better therapies might be produced from the 
combination of embryonic stem cell research and cloning by somatic cell 
nuclear transfer or cell nuclear replacement. In this context, the UK 
Government established an Expert Group led by the Chief Medical Officer 
(including nine people working in medicine or genetics, one person working in 
veterinary medicine, one ethicist, one specialist in medical law, one 
theologian, and the Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor), charged with 
                                                          
4
 The question if embryo destruction can be justified to achieve goals not 
related to research is addressed in Deckers J. (in press) Why Two Arguments 
from Probability Fail and One Argument from Thomson’s Violinist Succeeds 
in Justifying Embryo Destruction in Some Situations, Journal of Medical 
Ethics. 
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assessing the anticipated benefits, risks, and alternatives of new areas of 
research using embryos, and to advise Government on whether new research 
purposes should be added to the list approved by the 1990 Act. The Act had 
authorised the Secretary of State for Health to produce secondary legislation to 
extend this list.[32] Such an extension had already been recommended in 
reports issued by two other groups, a report published jointly by the HFEA and 
the Human Genetics Advisory Commission (the latter provided advice to UK 
Government on ethical issues related to human genetics before merging with 
other bodies into the Human Genetics Commission in 1999), and a report by 
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (an independent organisation which reports 
on ethical issues related to biology and medicine).[33,34] The group led by the 
Chief Medical Officer, Liam Donaldson, then produced a report with the title 
‘Stem Cell Research: Medical Progress with Responsibility’, also known as 
the ‘Donaldson Report’.[35] The Expert Group advocated an extension, and 
agreed with the gradualist position on the issue of the embryo’s status adopted 
by the Warnock Committee, or the view that the ‘respect owed to developing 
human life is regarded as increasing in proportion to the degree of 
development of the embryo’.[36] It concluded that embryonic stem cell 
research may proceed because of its ‘great potential to relieve suffering and 
treat disease’.[37] The recommendations of the Expert Group were then 
accepted by the UK Government.[38] New legislation was then drafted and 
debated in both Houses of Parliament. The following arguments - which will 
be examined shortly - were expressed on the issue of the status of the early 
embryo: three arguments from potentiality, an argument from capacities, an 
argument from probability, an argument from mourning, and an argument 
from ensoulment. 
  After the debate, the Human Fertilisation (Research Purposes) Regulations 
2001 were made on 24 January 2001, and came into force on 31 January 2001, 
to allow research (under paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the 1990 Act) aimed at 
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‘(a) increasing knowledge about the development of embryos, (b) increasing 
knowledge about serious disease, or (c) enabling any such knowledge to be 
applied in developing treatments for serious disease’.[39] In this way, the 
United Kingdom became the first country to legislate on these other types of 
research, most notably embryonic stem cell research. The scope of acceptable 
extensions includes the creation of embryos by somatic cell nuclear transfer 
for research purposes aimed at finding therapies, which has been referred to as 
‘therapeutic cloning’. While the debate in Parliament was frequently centred 
on the issue of cloning, Yvette Cooper, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
for Public Health, tried to reduce some Parliamentarians’ concerns about the 
proposed Human Fertilisation (Research Purposes) Regulations by expressing 
the view that therapeutic cloning was already legal under the 1990 Act, but 
that it now could be used for these additional purposes.[40] 
  The passing of the 2001 Regulations was a blow for Alton of Liverpool, who 
had pleaded for more time to debate the issues before a decision would be 
made. Instead, debate was carried on afterwards. In response to a proposal 
from Walton of Detchant, a House of Lords’ Select Committee (henceforth: 
HL Committee) was appointed to consider and report on the issues connected 
with stem cell research and human cloning, arising from the new regulations. I 
had the pleasure of contributing to one of their meetings aimed at gathering 
‘evidence’.5 After a series of such meetings, the Committee published a report 
supporting existing legislation.[41] Unlike the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert 
Group, the HL Committee tried to provide an answer to the question of why 
early embryos lack moral status. The Report includes the same arguments as 
those raised in both Houses of Parliament during the debate preceding the new 
regulations. The validity of these arguments is examined in what follows. 
                                                          
5
 The meeting was held at St John’s College, University of Durham, 13 
November 2001. 
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  First, there are three arguments from potentiality. The first is the view that the 
early embryo is potentially human, the second that the early embryo has a 
passive potentiality to become a human being with moral status, and the third 
that the early embryo has an active potentiality to become a human being with 
moral status. The first view, that the early embryo is not a human being, 
underlies the HL Committee’s assertion that even after the embryo has 
implanted ‘there is no trace of human structure’.[42] Likewise, the Donaldson 
Report stated that the early embryo ‘could develop into a human being’, or is 
‘a potential human being’.[43]6 Similar views were expressed in both Houses 
of Parliament. In the House of Commons, for instance, Yvette Cooper claimed 
that unneeded embryos ‘will not become human beings’.[44] And in the House 
of Lords, the moral philosopher and member of the Select Committee Onora 
O’Neill asserted, in her eloquent fashion, that the early embryo ‘lacks all 
internal structure’ and that ‘there is not even the beginnings of a glimmer of 
                                                          
6
 In the House of Commons, the same view was expressed by Ian Gibson, Joan 
Ruddock, and Robert Key (Hansard, 17 November 2000, columns 1192, 1210, 
1215), while Michael Fabricant stated that ‘a blastocyst is not a human being’ 
(Hansard, 15 December 2000, column 919). The related view, that embryos 
‘could develop into full human beings’, was espoused by Edward Leigh, an 
opponent of embryo research (Hansard, 31 October 2000, column 629). In the 
House of Lords, Hunt of Kings Heath, Kennedy of The Shaws, and Taverne 
referred with approval to the Donaldson Report’s claim (Hansard, 22 January 
2001, columns 19, 29, 47). In the same House, Sharp of Guildford expressed 
that the 1990 Act implicitly adopts the view that the early embryo is ‘not a 
human being’ (Hansard, 22 January 2001, column 110). Even Alton of 
Liverpool, a renowned opponent of embryo research, cited the relevant text 
from the Donaldson Report, without comment, in the same House (Hansard, 
22 January 2001, columns 63).  
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the human form’.[45]7 Yet no explanation is provided for why early embryos 
should not be human beings, or lack a human structure or form. The fact that 
early embryos do not possess the organs which foetuses, children or adults 
have is insufficient to justify this conclusion. Clearly, these people have some 
idea of what defines as ‘the’ human structure or form, yet no idea is provided 
of what this is or why early embryos should be excluded from having such a 
form. The position that early embryos lack some properties which they ought 
to possess before they can be considered to be human beings is problematic 
and has been challenged rightly by Alan Holland. Holland argues that, in a 
Darwinian world, it makes no sense to stipulate a list of properties which an 
organism ought to possess in order to be classified to belong to a particular 
species. Species properties are nothing but contingent manifestations of similar 
characteristics displayed by a breeding population. A necessary condition for 
belonging to the species homo sapiens, therefore, is not to possess some 
features which might be similar to the features of others, but to possess the 
right lineage. Since human embryos are created by other members of homo 
sapiens, they fulfil this condition.[46] 
  Perhaps these texts bear testimony to a human tendency to use sloppy 
language: rather than denying the early embryo’s humanity as such, the 
underlying assumption might be that the early embryo is not sufficiently 
similar to a more developed human being to have moral status. This may be 
what is behind Evan Harris’ claim, expressed in the House of Commons, that 
an early embryo is ‘much smaller than the head of a pin’ and that ‘there is no 
question of experimenting on anything that remotely resembles a foetus’; or 
behind Richard Harries’ claim, expressed in a public lecture (Newcastle 
University, UK, 20 April 2004), that ‘to the eye it is a blob of jelly’.[47] In one 
place, the HL Committee understands this lack of similarity in terms of an 
                                                          
7
 See also Howe’s views in Hansard, 22 January 2001, column 115. 
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alleged lack of (sufficient) identity: because the early embryo still contains 
cells which develop into the placenta and umbilical cord, and can still divide 
to constitute identical twins, the view that there is ‘such a continuity of 
identity’ as there is between babies and adults ‘is less plausible’.8[48] This is 
problematic for two reasons. First, neither possession of the capacity to twin 
nor possession of the capacity to form material which will later be discarded 
(such as the placenta or umbilical cord) justifies the conclusion that those who 
possess these capacities lack continuity of identity with those who lack either 
or both capacities. While two identical twins cannot say that they are identical 
with each other, it is not problematic for both of them to say that they are 
identical with the early embryo they once were. As I shall argue further below, 
this does not, however, lead to the conclusion that for the reverse process of 
fusion, where two gametes become one embryo, there is also a continuity of 
identity between either gamete and the embryo that forms from them. If we 
now focus on the fact that early embryos still contain cells which will develop 
into the placenta and umbilical cord, we must conclude that this fact does not 
undermine the continuity of identity between early embryos and more 
developed embryos either. There is no reason why the placenta and umbilical 
cord should not be regarded as integral parts of the developing embryo. 
Second, the Committee fails to explain why the existence of (sufficient) 
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 The same claim was made by Richard Harries in a public lecture (Newcastle 
University, 20 April 2004). Harries claimed that the possibility of twinning 
and the fact that the early embryo still contains cells which become the 
placenta and umbilical cord support the conclusion that it is not possible to 
‘say, for definite, that was me’. It seems to me that, even if I agreed to the 
moral importance of having sufficient ‘continuity of identity’, a stronger 
conclusion would be needed for its validity, to the effect that it is not possible 
to ‘say, for definite, that was’ not ‘me’.  
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‘continuity of identity’ should matter morally. If what mattered morally were 
the fact that one individual was still capable of developing into more than one 
individual, rather than ‘continuity of identity’ per se, the Committee should 
have argued that embryos with the capacity to become more than one 
individual are less valuable compared with embryos who lack this natural 
capacity, rather than argue that all early embryos lack moral status because 
some may – without being artificially separated - develop into twins (as I 
argued earlier on). As mentioned before, even then the question must be asked 
why the capacity to twin should matter morally. I return to this issue in my 
discussion of the argument from ensoulment. 
  The second argument from potentiality is the view that the early embryo has a 
passive potentiality to develop into a human being with moral status. The 
Warnock Committee suggested the validity of this view already by writing that 
some people think that the early embryo is not ‘a person’ or a ‘potential 
person’ because the ‘collection of cells … has no potential for development … 
unless it implants’, or is ‘transferred to a uterus’.[49]9 Likewise, Sally Keeble 
claimed in the House of Commons that early embryos ‘have the potential for 
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 In the House of Commons, this view was expressed by Ian Gibson, Michael 
Clark, Evan Harris, and Peter Brand. The last one, for example, expressed the 
view that ‘foetal cells’ do not ‘have the same status as a unique human being’, 
and that there is a great difference between ‘foetal material’ and a ‘born child’ 
(Hansard, 17 November 2000, columns 1192 and 1194-1195 and Hansard, 19 
December 2000, columns 250, 253). In the same House, Howard Stoate was 
keen to make the point that an embryo created by somatic cell nuclear transfer 
‘is not a human being’, first claiming that such an embryo’s lack of potentiality 
is like the sperm or egg’s lack of potentiality, then that this lack of potentiality 
lies in the fact that ‘nobody will be allowed to try’ to develop such an embryo 
(Hansard, 19 December 2000, columns 233-234). 
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life, which is not the same as being alive’, while Jenny Tonge claimed that 
‘human life does not begin until there is sustenance to maintain life from the 
placenta in the uterus’ and that the unimplanted embryo therefore is in ‘a pre-
life condition’.[50] In the same House, Evan Harris asserted that the blastocyst 
is a ‘disorganised cluster of cells’.[51] The HL Committee provides a more 
elaborate account, claiming that the view that the early embryo is only a 
‘potential person’ is backed up by ‘embryological evidence’: ‘Although the 
fertilised egg and blastocyst contain all the genetic signals required for human 
life, this is true of nearly all cells in the body. … Although the early embryo 
contains … the full genetic potential of any person(s) who may develop from 
it, it requires many other factors, particularly those provided by the maternal 
environment in the womb, to enable it to realise that potential.’[52]10 In a 
meeting of this Committee, Onora O’Neill expressed a similar view, claiming 
that, in an age of cloning by somatic cell nuclear transfer, this potential was 
possessed by all cells of the human body.11 The problem with these claims is 
that the embryo’s potentiality is misconceived. While both somatic cells and 
embryos require a suitable environment to develop, somatic cells (as well as 
gametes) need to be transformed into new entities before they can acquire the 
intrinsic potentiality to develop on their own account, while embryos already 
possess that potentiality. Ann Winterton expressed this view clearly in the 
House of Commons where she said that the early embryo has ‘the capacity to 
initiate, sustain, control and direct its own development’.[53]12 If the different 
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 In the House of Lords, Dick Taverne objected to the use of the word 
‘embryos’, preferring ‘embryonic cells’, for those ‘cells which are not to be 
implanted’ (Hansard, 22 January 2001, column 64). 
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 See note 5. 
12
 See Hansard, 17 November 2000, column 1203 and Hansard, 19 December 
2000, columns 243-244.  
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parts which constitute early embryos were not integrated, it seems hard to 
explain why these parts develop normally into one or more unified organisms 
in a continuous process from conception, rather than into a collection of body 
parts (for example, into a collection of hearts). It goes without saying that 
embryos need a suitable environment, but that is no different from what adults 
need to fulfill their potentialities. Embryos necessarily have this intrinsic 
potentiality for development, irrespective of whether or not their environment 
is suitable for their development. Neither haploid gametes nor diploid somatic 
cells possess this intrinsic potentiality. 
  The third argument from potentiality is the view that merely having the 
potentiality to reach a certain status is not sufficient to be granted that status 
already. This argument was adopted by Robert Key in the House of Commons, 
where he uses the view that there are ‘degrees of human sanctity’ to support 
his gradualist account of moral worth.[54] Likewise, the HL Committee 
supports the view that the early embryo is only ‘a potential person rather than 
… a person’ as follows: ‘A medical student is a potential physician, and if he 
or she qualifies may practise as such; but the potentiality alone does not confer 
a right to practise. A child is a potential voter but has no claim to be treated as 
a voter until reaching the age of 18.’[55] By analogy, even if it is granted that 
the early embryo has an active potentiality to become an adult, this does not 
mean that he or she has already acquired the status of an adult.13 The problem 
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 Richard Harries adopted the same argument in the aforementioned public 
lecture, using another analogy which has featured in the abortion debate since 
the early nineteen seventies: the alleged value difference between acorns and 
oak trees. The validity of this analogy is undermined in Deckers J. (2005) Why 
Current UK Legislation on Embryo Research Is Immoral. How the Argument 
from Lack of Qualities and the Argument from Potentiality Have Been 
Applied and Why They Should Be Rejected, Bioethics 19 (3) 251-271, p. 264. 
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with this argument, however, is that the moral status of medical students, 
children, or ‘less saintly people’, is no different from the status of physicians, 
people who are able to vote, or ‘more saintly people’. Therefore, while it is 
true that embryos are potential adults, the argument fails to establish that 
embryos only have a potentiality to become beings with moral status.  
  The HL Committee also adopts an argument from capacities to try to justify 
the view that the early embryo does not deserve a full measure of respect by 
arguing that ‘the basic arguments for respect are focused on (…) beings able to 
think, act, and communicate’.[56] The problem with this position is that it may 
rule out others as well, for example human infants. While one could make a 
case for infant thought, action, and communication, the HL Committee states 
that the capacity to act - the capacity which one might regard as the most basic 
amongst the three capacities listed - is lacking in infants. But the HL 
Committee then argues that respect is ‘extended’ to infants, which raises the 
question of why the same measure of respect is not also extended to early 
embryos.[57] A further problem with this view is that it fails to explain why 
research is restricted to early embryos, as the argument could be made that 
these capacities are also lacking in more developed embryos. This suggests 
that the reason why the HL Committee supports the use of early embryos, but 
not the destruction of more developed embryos or infants for research, must lie 
elsewhere. Some support for the argument from sentience seems to be given 
where the HL Committee writes that the fourteen days limit for research ‘has 
an objective justification insofar as it represents the stage at which the 
primitive streak … begins to appear’, a stage before which (as clarified in a 
preceding paragraph) ‘there can be no sentience’.[58]14 While it may be an 
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objective fact that the primitive streak appears around the fourteenth day, the 
HL Committee does not explain why this should be an ‘objective justification’ 
for research on embryos younger than fourteen days. As I shall argue in the 
final section, I am not convinced that the existence of variable capacities 
provides a moral justification for discrimination amongst humans. 
  A fifth argument bases the view that early embryos have little value on the 
view that there is a high probability that they may not be able to survive 
beyond a certain point regarded as critical, for example implantation. In the 
House of Commons, this argument was supported by Evan Harris and Peter 
Brand.[59] Harris, who acknowledges that he owes this view to ‘Church of 
England theologians’, appears to be bothered by the possibility that the 
‘majority of stars in heaven’ might be embryos who never implanted, which he 
feels is easier to reconcile with the idea that they lack moral status than with 
the idea that they have such status. The HL Committee appears to approve of 
this argument as well. Having claimed that the natural loss rate of early 
embryonic death is ‘as high as 75 per cent’, the Committee describes the 
following information as ‘consistent with’ its ‘gradualist view’: ‘Although 
would-be parents may feel sad at the natural loss of early embryos before 
implantation, there is no public mourning ritual associated with it, nor is there 
for the loss of surplus embryos left over from IVF treatment.’[60]15 The use of 
the word ‘loss’ to describe the destruction of spare embryos downplays the 
intentional act of destruction and suggests that ‘the loss of surplus embryos’ 
would be no different from the ‘natural loss of early embryos’. While the 
Committee does not state explicitly that the high probability that embryos 
                                                                                                                                                        
627; Hansard, 15 December 2000, column 919; Hansard, 19 December 2000, 
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 The argument is also supported by Onora O’Neill, a moral philosopher and 
member of the House of Lords (Hansard, 22 January 2001, column 68). 
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decay naturally counts as a reason for their lack of moral status, this may be 
what is suggested here. Whether or not this is a valid interpretation, at least the 
Committee’s chairman, Richard Harries, used the argument in the 
aforementioned public lecture. It was also used by Robert Winston, a specialist 
in reproductive medicine, in the House of Lords’ debate. Winston claimed that 
‘twelve per cent of human embryos in an in vitro fertilisation programme 
implant’ and ‘something probably similar happens in nature’. This would 
support the view that, ‘by nature’s standards’, the human embryo is ‘not 
sacrosanct’.[61] The argument is problematic. First, it sums over the survival 
odds of each individual embryo. While it may be true that ‘75 per cent’ (or 88 
per cent) of early embryos die young, this does not establish that each embryo 
has a ‘75 per cent’ (or 88 per cent) chance of dying early. For some, the 
chances of implanting or being born might be much higher than for others, 
who might be doomed from the start. Therefore, if the probability of a 
successful outcome (whether this be implantation or birth) would be what 
mattered morally, the argument should not be that all early embryos have little 
value, but only those who have a relatively small chance of a successful 
outcome. A second problem with the argument, however, is that many people 
would agree that, when it comes to assessing the moral worth of children or 
adults, the question of how large or small their chances are of surviving up to a 
certain stage are irrelevant. Therefore, the view that there is a high probability 
that early embryos might die young fails to justify that they lack moral status.     
  The above quotation from the HL Committee also contains an argument from 
mourning, supported also by Richard Harries in the aforementioned public 
lecture, and by Robert Key in the House of Commons: the absence of ‘public 
mourning ritual’ would support the view that the early embryo lacks moral 
status.[62] The problem with this argument is that we do not use the fact that 
the deaths of some children or adults do not cause a lot of grief in other people 
as evidence for their lack of moral status. Therefore, it is not clear why it 
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should support the view that early embryos lack moral status. One could object 
that there are other factors which may account for why some born people’s 
deaths are not mourned over (much), for example that it depends on a relative 
lack of friends or close friends, but that the death of anyone belonging to the 
class of early embryos is not mourned over much. The counterobjection is that 
this is not true, since many people go through severe mourning experiences 
when they experience early miscarriages. Another reason why there might be 
no ‘public mourning ritual’ for the death of an early embryo is that many 
women may not know that they are pregnant. Whether or not they are, it is 
surely the case that early embryos are not ‘public’ persons in the sense that 
they are not visibly present as independent persons within society, which may 
account for the lack of ‘public mourning ritual’. Finally, not too long ago 
many slaves’ deaths may not have been accompanied by a ‘public mourning 
ritual’. Yet I hope not many people today would argue that this should count as 
evidence for their lack of moral status. Even if it were the case that embryos’ 
deaths are not mourned over much, it is a naturalistic fallacy to conclude from 
this that embryos’ deaths ought not to be mourned over much, or that moral 
status ought not be granted to them. I conclude, therefore, that the argument 
from mourning is unconvincing.      
  Finally, two versions of the argument from ensoulment, or the view that early 
embryos are not ensouled and therefore lack moral status, have been supported 
in this debate. The chief advocate of the first version - identified also as one 
out of two Christian views by the HL Committee - has been the HL 
Committee’s chairman, Richard Harries.[63]16 Harries refers to Aristotle’s 
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embryology, where ‘there is first a vegetable soul, then an animal soul’, and 
only at 40 days after conception for men and at 90 days for women, an 
intellective soul.[64,65] While it is correct that Aristotle wrote that the fetus 
starts to move and differentiate only around 40 days after conception for boys 
and around 90 days for girls, Harries understands that this implies that, for 
Aristotle, ‘it is only at the last point that there is, properly speaking, a human 
being’.[66] He claims that a similar position was adopted in the Christian 
Church, at least in the ‘western’ tradition, until the nineteenth century when 
the view that ensoulment occurs at conception became ‘firmed up’.[67] 
Harries claims that his gradualist account is supported by ‘this understanding 
of the western tradition’.[68] This view is subject to a number of criticisms.  
  First, Harries claims that the present Catholic position that ensoulment occurs 
at conception stems largely from the nineteenth century, and refers to a number 
of early and medieval Christian writers who thought otherwise. While Harries 
is correct that some Christians have supported ‘delayed ensoulment’ theories, 
in his article on ‘The Appeal to the Christian Tradition in the Debate about 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research’, David Jones has illustrated that the view that 
ensoulment occurs at conception was by no means absent from the early 
Christian tradition.[69,70] 
  Second, Harries claims that the delayed ensoulment theory finds Biblical 
support in Exodus 21.22-24, where a distinction is made between a ‘fully 
formed’ and a ‘not fully formed’ fetus (literally: ‘µή ẻξεικονισµένον’, or ‘not 
yet so formed as to be a copy or portrayal of the human form’), and where 
anyone found involved in the destruction of the latter is held to be subject to 
less severe penalties compared with anyone found guilty of destruction of the 
former.[71] In fact, the distinction is absent from the Hebrew text, but stems 
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can be found at http://www.cofe.anglican.org/info/socialpublic/cnr.html  
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from a mistranslation in the Septuagint, the influential pre-Christian Greek 
translation of the Scriptures. In the other passages where the Hebrew word 
‘ןוֹס’ occurs (Genesis 42.4,38;44.29), the word could not possibly be 
translated by ‘fully formed’.17 In fact, the Septuagint translates the word in 
these other passages as ‘sickness’. In the context of Exodus 21.22-24, the best 
translation may be ‘harm’ or ‘injury’. In other words, the gradation in penalty 
applies not to the issue of whether or not the fetus is ‘fully formed’ (which, 
anyhow, need not be synonymous with ‘ensouled’), but to the question if the 
pregnant woman suffers further injury apart from having a miscarriage. Harries 
is right, though, that the distinction between ‘formed’ and ‘unformed’ then 
found its way into Christian theology through Augustine (as documented by 
Jones), who made reference to the distinction relying on an old Latin 
translation of the Septuagint.[72,73] Also, Jones has documented that some 
writers then started to identify the distinction between ‘fully formed’ and ‘not 
fully formed’ with the distinction between animated and inanimated, providing 
the example of an anonymous work from the fifth century, originally thought 
to be Augustine’s.[74,75] 
  Third, the suggestion that, for Aristotle, the intellective soul was only present 
a long time after conception is flawed. Aristotle thought the first movements 
could be registered on the fortieth and the ninetieth day after conception for 
boys and girls respectively, but doubted the accuracy of his conclusions. More 
importantly, he held that the early embryo contained all three souls from the 
beginning, not in act, but in potency. While the vegetative power would be 
actualised before the sensitive power, and the sensitive power before the 
intellective power, all three powers were held to be present before their 
actualisation, as different parts of one soul.[76,77]  
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  Finally, and most problematically, for Aristotle, the cause of the creation of 
these three successive stages of the soul was the sperm, while for Aquinas (the 
first Christian theologian to use Aristotle’s work extensively) the sperm was 
the cause of the creation of the ‘lower’ souls, yet not of the intellective soul 
(which he thought had to be created directly by God, that is: without the use of 
sperm), and therefore the sperm had to continue existing until this process was 
completed.[78,79] Yet, since Karl Ernst von Baer observed and described the 
mammaliam ovum for the first time in 1827, complementing Reinier de 
Graaf’s first observations of the ovarian follicle in 1672 and Antoni van 
Leeuwenhoek’s first observations of the sperm in 1677, it was only a matter of 
time before further observations would prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
both were involved in the creation of an embryo.[80] Important breakthroughs 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century were the work of Gregor Mendel, 
who discovered from his observations of pea plants that organisms inherit two 
genes for each trait, one from each parent, and the observation (originally of a 
nematode worm) and description of meiosis during gametogenesis in animals 
by Edouard Van Beneden.[81,82] The latter observation corroborated Wilhelm 
August Oscar Hertwig’s conclusion, based on the observation of sea urchins, 
that sperm and egg fuse in animals that reproduce sexually.[83] Thus, we now 
know that the sperm does not continue to exist after conception. This is 
incompatible with the view that the sperm might be the cause of ensoulment at 
any stage after conception. The idea that the early embryo is alive solely by 
virtue of the soul of the male parent, present in the sperm, and that the early 
embryo is not an independent living being until some time after conception, 
flies in the face of modern embryology. In the light of these developments, it 
seems strange how anyone could still hold on to the view that ensoulment does 
not occur at conception. Even more bizarre is Walton of Detchant’s statement, 
which he claims (erroneously) was presented as Aquinas’s view ‘until the 
middle of the 19th century’, that ‘the foetus’ does ‘not develop as an 
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independent human being and that life’ does ‘not begin until the foetus’ is 
‘capable of independent existence outside the womb’.[84] This great 
progression in embryological understanding achieved over the course of the 
nineteenth century, rather than - as Harries claims - the greater incidence of 
abortion resulting from greater technical expertise in the carrying out of 
abortions, may also have prompted pope Pius IX into deciding, in 1869, that 
equal penalties should apply to early and late abortions.[85,86]  
  I shall now turn to the second version of the argument from ensoulment, a 
variant of the argument from individuality found in the Warnock Report. It is 
the view that early embryos cannot be ensouled because they might still divide 
into more than one organism or fuse to become one organism, and that they 
therefore lack moral status. Peter Brand expressed this argument in the House 
of Commons, while Richard Harries has claimed that the HL Select 
Committee held that the possibility of twinning excludes the early embryo 
from being a person, and therefore presumably from being an ensouled human 
being.[87,88] If we understand the soul in the traditional (Aristotelian) sense 
as the principle that provides organisation and direction to the human body, 
the implication is that early embryos lack such a principle. In other words, 
early embryos would either be like body parts which might have relative 
autonomy but which are ultimately controlled by the souls of the bodies in 
which they are situated, or like machines which are controlled entirely by 
external forces. Yet, since early embryos appear to develop autonomously, and 
given the fact that a strong continuity exists between a fourteen and a fifteen 
day old embryo, irrespective of whether or not twinning or fusion still occurs 
on the fourteenth day, the view that the principle which directs the 
development of early embryos is different from the principle which directs the 
development of more developed embryos is implausible. A more plausible 
view is that ensoulment occurs at conception, given that no such continuity 
exists between gametes kept in separation from each other and the early 
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embryo who comes into existence when gametes are brought together. Another 
plausible view is that the cause of ensoulment, the principle which fuses sperm 
and egg, is not an external agent, but the early embryo who creates himself or 
herself out of the materials provided by the sperm and egg. The Christian 
theological perspective supported by Harries and many others, where an 
external agent, God, intervenes to infuse the soul, lacks a satisfactory answer 
to the problem of evil. What it cannot answer is, for instance, the question why 
a good God would infuse souls inside the bodies of women after rape? That 
Harries wants to hold on to a belief in God’s goodness seems apparent from 
what has been reported to be his concern that, if the view that ensoulment 
occurs at conception were accepted, together with the view that three quarters 
of all embryos fail to implant, ‘three quarters of heaven would be populated by 
souls that lived for less than a week’.18 The reason why Harries would find this 
conclusion ‘strange’, and therefore the first premise unacceptable, may relate 
to the view that his belief in the goodness of God is incompatible with the idea 
that many souls die at such an early stage.[89] Regardless of this theological 
critique, what is more problematic is that those who base the view that the 
early embryo is not ensouled either on Harries’ concern over the possibility of 
twinning or on Brand’s concern over the possibility of fusion, are unwilling to 
change traditional embryological conceptions in the light of modern 
embryology. Before the advent of modern embryology, the phenomena of 
twinning and embryonic fusion were understood even less than they are today, 
and therefore there was no need to conceive of the possibility of twinning or 
fusion occurring after conception. Accordingly, it was thought that a soul 
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could not divide into souls or fuse with other souls. This view fitted common 
sense, as common observation was sufficient to conclude that born humans no 
longer twin or fuse with other humans to become new human individuals. Yet, 
since we have now managed to observe what takes places in the early stages 
after conception and know that twinning and fusion can occur after 
conception, why should we hold on to the view that a soul cannot divide into 
souls or fuse with another soul? Why should either the splitting of one soul 
into two or more souls, or the merging of multiple souls into one soul, be 
regarded as impossible? I conclude, therefore, that both versions of the 
argument from ensoulment are flawed. 
 
Should early embryos be granted moral status? 
 
  In this article, an overview of the arguments on the status of the early embryo 
that have been used by the main legal advisory bodies and members of 
Parliament in support of legal developments related to embryo research in the 
UK has been provided, the main focus being on the most recent developments. 
I have shown that none of these arguments are convincing. While the UK is 
currently regarded as being one of the most ‘liberal’ countries as far as the 
legitimacy and scope of embryo research is concerned, many have expressed 
the view that its legal stance and legislative framework can be an inspiration 
for other legislatures.19 What my paper has shown is that the arguments 
underpinning this framework provide a shaky, rather than - as claimed by the 
House of Commons’ Science and Technology Select Committee on Human 
Reproductive Technologies and the Law - a ‘firm foundation’ for 
legislation.[90] However, while it is one thing to undermine a range of 
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arguments that have been used to deny moral status to the early embryo, it is 
another matter to make a convincing case for why the early embryo should be 
granted such status. On this issue, I agree with David Hume’s position, cited 
with approval by Warnock, that morality is ‘more properly felt than judg’d 
of’.[91,92] Warnock rightly adds, though, that the fact ‘that a decision is based 
on sentiment by no means entails that arguments cannot be adduced to support 
it’.[93] These arguments, however, might not convince those who have 
different values or sentiments. This need not result in a kind of moral paralysis 
where those with irreconcilable values refuse to engage in debate with one 
another, or disparage the positions held by others by labelling them as 
irrational. Neither is it necessary to believe that those with irreconcilable 
values will never be able to reconcile their differences. While it is beyond the 
remit of this paper to make an elaborate case against the gradualist account of 
the embryo’s status which has been supported by these legal developments, my 
final paragraph aims to sketch the position I have developed elsewhere, that 
early embryos should be granted moral status. I also illustrate how this 
position might be undermined both by an objectifying discourse and by the 
view that assigning moral status to the embryo is necessarily incompatible 
with embryo destruction.[94]  
  My view is that we should promote equality between all human beings and 
treat all humans as equal, rather than assign different values to different human 
beings depending on how many properties or capacities each human being may 
possess. If discrimination against infants or children, even though they are a 
long way from being adults, is not acceptable, then discrimination against 
early embryos is not acceptable either. While many people may not support 
this analogy, a number of people expressed their appreciation for such a 
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position when I talked about the subject at a recent symposium in Oxford.20 
Discourse about the human embryo often portrays the embryo as if he or she 
were an abstract, alien entity, the product of those who experiment with 
substances in test tubes in laboratories. The moral position that human 
embryos are suitable objects for research might be favoured by this kind of 
discourse. When I showed the first ultrasound scan of my daughter, no more 
than eight weeks after her conception, followed by a picture of my six year old 
daughter now, and asked rhetorically if adopting a gradualist position might 
mean accepting the view that she was quite worthless around the time her first 
picture was taken, many conference attendees realised that a different 
discourse was possible, and started questioning the gradualist account, 
reflected in the reactions I received after my presentation. Another reason why 
many people may reject the view that the early embryo has moral status might 
relate to the widely held view - adopted also by the HL Committee - that such 
a position is incompatible with embryo destruction.[95] The view is then 
rejected because the position that embryo destruction should not be allowed 
under any circumstances, including, for instance, cases of pregnancy after rape, 
is regarded as unacceptable. I have argued elsewhere, however, that the view 
that ascribing moral status to the embryo is incompatible with all forms of 
embryo destruction, is flawed, but that it is incompatible with the destruction 
of embryos for research.[96] Killing a human being is a serious act of 
violence, irrespective of whether or not embryos feel pain. Children, who have 
not had the same amount of exposure to the ‘laboratory discourse’ on embryos, 
are no less horrified when they hear about embryo research by being told that 
these early embryos are so small and undeveloped that they do not even feel 
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that they are being destroyed. What may be more acute in their understanding 
is that human embryos are not aliens, but that – to use the words used by 
Edward Leigh expressed in the House of Commons – ‘we were all at that stage 
once’.[97] Perhaps the paediatrician John Wyatt is right when he claims, in his 
article on ‘Medical Paternalism and the Fetus’, that ‘nearly all of us share 
deep-rooted intuitions that the protection, support, and nurturing of vulnerable 
human beings … is an essential duty of a civilised society.’[98] While 
supporters of embryonic stem cell research might claim that the protection of 
vulnerable people is precisely what their research is about, the means by which 
this must be achieved should not include the destruction of other people. 
However, in cultures where many nonhuman animals are objectified and killed 
gratuitously, the killing of human embryos for less trivial purposes may not be 
surprising. From the perspective of Ken Wilber’s transpersonal psychology, 
the destruction of others in what Wilber calls ‘Atman projects’ is a coping 
strategy used by individuals anxious about their mortality.[99] From this 
perspective, the words of Alison Murdoch - a member of the Newcastle 
Fertility Centre which was granted the first UK licence in 2004 to create 
embryos by somatic cell nuclear transfer - who is reported to have said that 
spare embryos ‘have no more moral status than blood taken from a patient’, 
carry deeper meaning.[100]21 While religious sacrifices of blood may have 
become rare events in the modern world, the destruction of embryos for 
research might fulfil a similar psychological function: to provide an illusory 
sense of security in the fight against one’s own mortality and one’s ultimate 
lack of control.  
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